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Re-conceptualizing
Generalization: Old Issues
in a New Frame
G i a m p i e t r o G o b o
INTRODUCTION
Even though qualitative methods are now
recognized in the methodological literature,
they are still regarded with skepticism by
some methodologists, mainly those with
statistical training. One reason for this skep-
ticism concerns whether qualitative research
results can be generalized, which is doubted
not only because they are derived from
only a few cases, but also because even
where a larger number is studied these
are generally selected without observing
the rigorous criteria of statistical sampling
theory. In this regard, the methodology
textbooks still distinguish samples into two
types: probability samples (simple ran-
dom, systematic, proportional stratified, non-
proportional stratified, multistage, cluster,
area, and their various combinations), and
non-probability ones (haphazard or conve-
nience, quota, purposive, of the emblematic
case, snowball, telephone)1. With regards the
latter is stated:
the obvious disadvantage of nonprobability sam-
pling is that, since the probability that a person
will be chosen is not known, the investigator
generally cannot claim that his or her sample
is representative of the larger population. This
greatly limits the investigator’s ability to generalize
his or her ﬁndings beyond the speciﬁc sample
studied (…) A nonprobability sample may prove
perfectly adequate if the researcher has no desire
to generalize his or her ﬁndings beyond the sample
(Bailey, 1978: 92).
This position again tends to relegate
qualitative research to the marginal role
of furnishing ancillary support for surveys,
which is precisely as it was conceived
by Barton and Lazarsfeld (1955) and the
methodologists of their time.
The aim of this study is to show that
this methodological denigration of qualitative
research is overly severe and unjustified,
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for three reasons. First, because the use of
probability samples and statistical inference
in social research often proves problem-
atic. Second, because there are numerous
disciplines, in both the social and human
sciences, whose theories are based exclusively
on research conducted on only a few cases.
Third, because, pace the methodological
orthodoxy, a significant part of sociological
knowledge, is idiographic. My intention is
therefore not to criticize sampling theory
or its applications; rather, it is to remedy
a situation where statistical inference is
deemed the only acceptable method, and
idiographic generalization as scientifically ill-
founded. Finally qualitative researchers do not
need to throw away the baby generalization
with the bathwater of probability sampling,
because we can have generalizations without
probability.
THE PROBLEMATIC USE OF
PROBABILITY SAMPLES IN SOCIAL
RESEARCH
Several authors (among them Goode and Hatt,
1952; Chain, 1963; Galtung, 1967; Capecchi,
1972) have stressed that the application of
statistical sampling theory in sociological
contexts gives rise to various difficulties.
This theory, in fact, requires the researcher
to construct a probability sample (one, that
is, where each subject’s likelihood of being
selected is known and also every item has
an equal chance of being selected), and the
cases must be selected in rigorously random
manner. But these two requirements are not
easy to satisfy in social research, because their
fulfillment encounters a series of obstacles,
not all of which can be overcome.
There is no space to describe in depth the
problems and limits of statistical sampling
theory (see Gobo, 2004). I will briefly
examine three limits only:
1 The difﬁculty of ﬁnding sampling frames (lists
of population) for certain population sub-sets,
because these frames are often not available.
How, for example, can a random sample of the
unemployed be extracted if the whole list of
unemployed people is not available beforehand?
It is true thatmany unemployed people are enrolled
at job placement ofﬁces, but it is equally true
that not all unemployed people are so enrolled.
Consequently, the majority of studies on particular
segments of the population cannot make use
of population lists: consider studies on blue-
collar workers, the unemployed, home-workers,
artists, immigrants, housewives, pensioners, foot-
ball supporters, members of political movements,
charity workers, elderly people living alone, and
so on.
2 The phenomenon of nonresponse. The concept
of random selection is theoretically very simple
and, thanks to the ideal-typical image of the box,
quite clear to the general public. This clarity is
misleading, however, because human beings differ
from balls in a ballot box in two respects: they
are not immediately accessible to the researcher,
and they are free to decide not to answer. In fact,
account must be taken of the gap (which varies
according to the research project) between the
initial sample (all the individuals about whom we
want to collect information) and the ﬁnal sample
(the cases aboutwhichwehave been able to obtain
information); the two sets may correspond, but
usually some of the objects in the ﬁrst sample
are not surveyed. As Groves and Lyberg (1988:
191) pointed out, nonresponse error threatens
the characteristic which makes the survey unique
among research methods: its statistical inference
from sample to population. If the sample is at odds
with the probability model, nothing can be said
about its general representativeness; that is, about
whether it truly reproduces all the characteristics
of the population.
3 Representativeness and generalizability: two sides
of the same coin? The social science textbooks
usually describe generalizability as the natural
outcome of a prior probabilistic procedure.
In other words, the necessary condition for
carrying out a statistical inference is previous
use of a probability sample. It is forgotten,
however, that probability/representativeness and
generalizability are not two sides of the same
coin. The former is a property of the sample,
whilst the latter concerns the ﬁndings of research.
Put otherwise: between construction of a sample
and conﬁrmation of a hypothesis there intervene a
complex set of activities which pertain to at least
seven different domains: (1) the trustworthiness of
operational deﬁnitions and operational acts; (2)
the reliability of the data collection instrument;
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(3) the appropriateness of conceptualizations;
(4) the accuracy of the researcher’s descriptions,
categorizations, and/or measurements; (5) to be
successful with observational (or ﬁeld) relations;
(6) the validity of the data; and (7) the validity
of the interpretation. These activities, and their
relative errors (called ‘measurement errors’ in the
literature), may impair the connection between
probability/representativeness and generalizabil-
ity – a not infrequent occurrence in a complex
activity like social research.
These drawbacks do not signify that proba-
bility sampling and statistical inference are
instruments by their nature unsuited to social
research. Rather, according to the research
setting, they are instruments with certain
practical disadvantages that can sometimes be
remedied and sometimes cannot.
In light of these difficulties, probability
sampling cannot be propounded as the only
model suited to the generalization of findings.
As Geertz (1973: 21) points out, it is
not only statistical inference that enables
the move from ‘local truths to general
visions.’ Moreover, as we have seen, not
all sociological phenomena can be studied
with rigorous application of the principles of
sampling theory, the consequence being that
the adoption of other forms of generalization
has been vital for social research: otherwise,
an important part of sociological theory (that
based on research conducted on a few cases or
even on haphazard or convenience samples as
in the cases of, for example, Gouldner, Dalton,
Becker, Goffman, Garfinkel, Cicourel) would
never have been produced.
GENERALIZATION AS SEEN BY
QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGISTS
Qualitative researchers have taken up a variety
of positions in reaction to the pronouncement
that those who do not use probability samples
cannot generalize. The most extreme of
them have (paradoxically) on the one hand
accepted the verdict but on the other dis-
missed sampling as ‘a mere positivist worry’
(Lincoln and Guba, 1979; Denzin, 1983).
Some have aptly pointed out that ‘most
social anthropological and a good deal of
sociological theorizing has been founded
upon case studies’ (Mitchell, 1983: 188) or
has been the product of exclusively theoretical
inquiry (without, that is, being grounded
on systematic research). The more moderate
have complied with the injunction of the
statisticians but reconceptualized the problem
by claiming that there are two types of
generalization (which they have termed in
various ways): enumerative (statistical) vs.
analytic induction (Znaniecki, 1934: 236;
Mitchell, 1983: 191); formalistic/scientific vs.
naturalistic generalization (Stake, 1978: 6);
distributive vs. theoretical generalization
(Hammersley, 1992: 186ff; Williams, 2000:
215; Payne and Williams, 2005: 296–7).
The first type of generalization involves
estimating the distribution of particular fea-
tures within a finite population; the second,
eminently theoretical, is concerned with the
relations among the variables in any sample
of the relevant kind (moreover, the population
of relevant cases is potentially infinite).
The latter is usually based on identifying
causal or essential relations among particular
categories, whose character is defined by
those relations, so that it is inferred that all
instances of those categories are involved in
the specified type of relation.
Even though some qualitative researchers
may privately agree with Znaniecki (1934:
236–7) that analytical induction is the true
method of science and it is the superior method
(because it discovers the causal relations of
a phenomenon rather than only the probabilis-
tic ones of co-occurrence), the idea that there
exist two types of generalization represents
acceptance of the statisticians’ diktat. It also
represents acceptance of a ‘political’ division
into areas of competence: a compromise
already envisaged by some members of the
Chicago School, like Burgess (1927), who
maintained that statistics and case studies
were mutually complementary2 with their
own criteria of excellence.
The distinction between the two types of
generalization has been drawn with exem-
plary clarity by Alberoni and colleagues, who
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wrote in their Introduction to a study on
108 political activists of the Italian Commu-
nist Party and the Christian Democrat Party as
follows:
if we want to know, for instance, how many
activists of both parties in the whole country are
from families of Catholic or Communist tradition,
(this) study is useless. Conversely, if we want
to show that family background is important in
determining whether a citizen will be an activist in
the Communist rather than Christian Democratic
party, this research can give the right answer. If we
want to ﬁnd out what are and have been the
percentages of the different ‘types’ of activists […]
in both parties, the study is useless, whereas if we
want to show that these types exist the study gives
a certain answer […]. The study does not aim at
giving a quantitative objective description of Italian
activism, but it can aid understanding of some
of its essential aspects, basic motivations, crucial
experiences and typical situations which gave birth
to Italian activism and help keep it alive. (1967: 13)
The two generalizations are therefore made in
completely different ways3.
This moderate stance has been adopted by
the majority of qualitative methodologists,
some of whom have sought to underscore the
difference between statistical and ‘qualitative’
generalization by coining specific terms for
the latter. This endeavor has given rise to
a welter of terms: ‘naturalistic generalization’
(Stake, 1978: 6), ‘transferability’ (Lincoln
and Guba, 1979), ‘translatability’ (Goetz and
LeCompte, 1984), ‘analytic generalization’
(Yin, 1984), ‘extrapolation’ (Mitchell, 1983:
191; Alasuutari, 1995: 196–7), ‘moderatum
generalization’ (Williams, 2000; Payne and
Williams, 2005), and others.
Five concepts of generalization
At least five different positions on the
generalizability of research results can be
identified within the qualitative methodolog-
ical tradition (see Ragin and Becker, 1992;
Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000).
The first position, the most radical of
them, has been assumed by Lincoln and
Guba (1979), Guba (1981), Guba and Lincoln
(1982), and Denzin (1983). It adheres to the
traditional position that qualitative research is
an idiographic account which lays no claim
to generalization (see Burrell and Morgan,
1979). Norman K. Denzin is very explicit on
the matter:
The interpretivist rejects generalization as a goal
and never aims to draw randomly selected samples
of human experience. For the interpretivist every
instance of social interaction, if thickly described
(Geertz, 1973), represents a slice from the life world
that is the proper subject matter for interpretative
inquiry (…) Every topic (…) must be seen as
carrying its own logic, sense or order, structure, and
meaning. (Denzin, 1983: 133–4)4
Guba and Lincoln (1981: 62) likewise claim
that ‘it is virtually impossible to imagine any
human behavior that is not heavily mediated
by the context in which it occurs. One can
easily conclude that generalizations that are
intended to be context free will have little
that is useful to say about human behavior.’
However, Guba and Lincoln moderate their
position by introducing two novel elements:
a new formulation of the concept of working
hypothesis proposed by Cronbach (1975), and
the new concept of transferability.
According to Cronbach, ‘when we give
proper weight to local conditions, any gen-
eralization is a working hypothesis, not
a conclusion’(1975: 125). Hence, Lincoln and
Guba maintain,
local conditions (…) make it impossible to gener-
alize. If there is a ‘true’ generalization, it is that
there can be no generalization. And note that
‘working hypotheses’ are tentative both for the
situation in which they ﬁrst uncovered and for
other situations; there are always differences in
context from situation to situation, and even the
single situation differs over time. (1979, reprinted
2000: 39)
They now make their own proposal,
which has become well-known in qualitative
research:
How can one tell whether a working hypothesis
developed in Context Amight be applicable in Con-
text B?We suggest that the answer to that question
must be empirical: the degree of transferability is
a direct function of the similarity between the two
contexts, what we shall call ‘ﬁttingness’. Fittingness
is deﬁned as the degree of congruence between
sending and receiving contexts. If Context A and
Context B are ‘sufﬁciently’ congruent, thenworking
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hypotheses from the sending originating context
may be applicable in the receiving context. (Lincoln
and Guba, 1979, reprinted 2000: 40)
However, transferability is not an inferential
process performed by the researcher (who
cannot know all the other contexts of
research). Rather, it is a choice made by the
reader, who on the basis of argumentative
logic and a thick description (of the case
study) produced by the researcher, may
decide (on his/her own responsibility – see
Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 102)
to transfer this knowledge to other situations
that she/he deems similar (Lincoln and Guba,
1979, reprinted 2000: 40). The reader, basing
this on the persuasive power of the arguments
used by the researcher, decides on the
similarity between the (sending) context of the
case studied and the (receiving) contexts to
which the reader him/herself intends to apply
the results (Guba and Lincoln, 1982: 246).
To conclude, these authors are convinced
that ‘generalizations are impossible since
phenomena are neither time- nor context-
free’; however, ‘some transferability of these
hypotheses may be possible from situation to
situation, depending on the degree of temporal
and contextual similarity’ (Guba and Lincoln,
1982: 238).
A second, more moderate, approach has
been proposed by Stake (1978: 1994), who
argues that the purpose of case studies is
not so much to produce general conclusions
as to describe and analyze the principal
features of the phenomenon studied. If these
features concern an emblematic case of
political, social, or economic importance (for
example, the decision-making procedures of
a large institution like the US Department
of Defense), the ‘intrinsic case study’ will
per se produce results of indubitable intrinsic
relevance5, even though they cannot be
generalized in accordance with the canons of
scientific induction:
naturalistic generalization, arrived at by recognizing
the similarities of objects and issues in and out of
context and by sensing the natural covariations of
happenings. To generalize this way is to be both
intuitive and empirical, and not idiotic.
Naturalistic generalizations develop within a person
as a product of experience. They derive from
the tacit knowledge of how things are, why
they are, how people feel about them, and
how these things are likely to be later or in
other places with which this person is familiar.
They seldom take the form of predictions but
they lead regularly to expectations (…) These
generalizations may become verbalized, passing of
course from tacit knowledge to propositional; but
they have not yet passed the empirical and logical
tests that characterize formal (scholarly, scientiﬁc)
generalizations. (Stake, 1978: 6)
A third position, which is contiguous
to the intrinsic case study, has been put
forward by Connolly (1998). It starts from
the distinction between extensive vs. intensive
studies. The aim of the former (like case
studies) is to identify statistically significant
and therefore generalizable causal relations;
the aim of the latter is to reconstruct in detail
the mechanisms that connect cause and effect.
Like Stake, Connolly relieves the case study
of responsibility for formal generalization, but
he gives it a task complementary to such gen-
eralization, explaining (via the mechanisms)
correlations whose statistical significance has
already been documented by other studies.
These three positions have a common
basis consisting in the concept of ‘theoretical
sampling’ proposed by Glaser and Strauss
(1967), Schatzman and Strauss (1973) and
Strauss (1987): when we do not possess
complete information about the population,
cases are selected according to their status on
one or more properties identified as the subject
matter for research.As Mason writes, ‘theoret-
ical sampling is concerned with constructing
a sample which is meaningful theoretically
because it builds in certain characteristics
or criteria which help to develop and test
your theory and explanation’ (1996: 94). And
Strauss and Corbin are very explicit on the
concept of generalization:
in terms of making generalization to a larger popu-
lation, we are not attempting to generalize as
such but to specify […] the condition under which
our phenomena exist, the action/interaction that
pertains to them, and the associated outcomes or
consequences. This means that our theoretical for-
mulation applies to these situation or circumstances
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but to no others. (1990: 191, bold in the original
text)
In other words the aim is not to generalize
to some finite population but to develop
theoretical ideas that will have general
validity.
More practical are authors who engage
in ‘evaluation research’ (Cronbach, 1982;
Pawson and Tilley, 1997). These ground their
reasoning on the notion of the cumulability
of knowledge: case study after case study,
in the course of time in a particular sector
of research, there accumulates a repertoire
or inventory of the possible forms that
a particular object of study may assume.
As Pawson and Tilley (1997: 119–20) put
it, in polemic with Guba and Lincoln, what
can be transferred between studies are not
‘lumps of cases’ but ‘sets of ideas’ which
enable understanding of general mechanisms.
In other words, cumulability is the prelude for
qualitative generalizability.
The final position, and perhaps the oldest
of them, is represented by Znaniecki’s method
of analytic induction. The purpose of analytic
induction is to uncover causal relations
through identification of the essential charac-
teristics of the phenomenon studied. To this
end, the method starts not with a hypothesis
but with a limited set of cases from which an
initial explanatory hypothesis is then derived.
If the initial hypothesis fails to be confirmed
by one case, it is revised. Additional cases of
the same class of phenomena are then selected.
If the hypothesis is not confirmed by these
further cases, the conceptual definition of the
phenomenon is revised. The process continues
until the hypothesis is no longer refuted
and further study tells the researcher nothing
new (Znaniecki, 1934: 236ff). The inner
logic of analytic induction derives from
Mill’s ‘method of agreement’ and ‘method of
difference.’
There are several variants of Znaniecki’s
method of analytic induction. One of them is
Mitchell’s (1983) critical case study approach.
Analytic induction revisited has been also
widely used in comparative studies based on
a small numbers of cases ‘when little more
than a handful of nations or organizations –
sometimes even fewer – are compared with
respect to the forces driving a societal
outcome such a political development or
an organizational characteristic’ (Lieberson,
1992, reprinted in 2000: 208).
The unavoidableness of
generalization
Sampling and generalizing are unavoidable
practices because, even before being sci-
entific, they are everyday life activities
deeply rooted in thought, language, and
practice (Gobo, 2004). With regard to thought,
cognitive psychologists have demonstrated
the tendency of people to generalize on
the basis of a few observed characteristics
or events, a process called the heuristic of
representativeness by Kahneman and Tversky
(1972) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
With regard to the world of language, the
same function is performed, as Becker has
stated, by ‘synecdoche, a rhetorical figure in
which we use a part for something to refer the
listener or reader to the whole it belongs to’
(1998: 67). Finally, in the world of action, the
seller shows a sample of cloth to the customer;
in a paint shop the buyer skims through the
catalogue of color shades in order to select
a paint; the buyer tastes in order to choose a
wine or a cheese; the teacher asks a student
questions to assess his or her knowledge
about the syllabus. In everyday life, social
actors constantly sample and generalize.
As Gomm, Hammersley and Foster point out,
‘we all engage in naturalistic generalizations
routinely in the course of our life, and this
may take the form of empirical generalization
as well as of informal theoretical inference.
Given this, there is no reason in principle
why case study research should not provide
the basis for empirical generalization’ (2000:
104). This is also because the unavoidability
of generalization is epistemologically and
reflexively founded. As Gomm, Hammersley
and Foster acutely observe:
the very meaning of the word ‘case’ implies that
what it refers to is a case [instance or example]
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of something. In other words, we necessarily
identify cases in terms of general categories (…)
the idea that somehow cases can be identiﬁed
independently of our orientation to them is false.
It is misleading to talk of the uniqueness of cases
(…) we can only identify their distinctiveness on the
basis of a notion of what is typical or representative
of some categorial group or population. (Gomm,
Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 104)
The unavoidableness of generalizing is
such that ‘in practice, much case study
research has in fact put forward empirical
generalizations’ (Gomm, Hammersley and
Foster, 2000: 98) and ‘current qualitative
researchers often seem to produce [general-
ization] unconsciously’ (Payne and Williams,
2005: 297).
FOR AN IDIOGRAPHIC SAMPLING
THEORY
The thesis (which I have called ‘moderate’)
that there are two types of generalization
has had the indubitable merit of cooling the
dispute with quantitative methodologists and
of legitimating two ways to conduct research.
However, this political compromise has also
had a number of harmful consequences.
First, it has not stimulated reflection on how
to emancipate ‘qualitative’ generalization
from its subordination to statistical infer-
ence. Traditional methodologists continue
to attribute inferior status to qualitative
research, on the grounds that although it can
produce interesting results, they have a limited
extension only. This long-standing positivist
prejudice has been recently reinforced by
the extreme positions taken up by Lincoln
and Guba (1979) and Denzin (1983). Their
insistence that generalization in interpretative
research is impossible, and that their work
is not intended to produce scientific general-
izations, paradoxically fits perfectly with the
equally intransigent position of quantitative
methodologists. As Gomm, Hammersley and
Foster, observe, ‘to deny the possibility of
case studies providing the basis for empirical
generalizations is to accept the views of their
critics too readily’ (2000: 98). Even though
it may be a coincidence, the fact that
Egon Guba was a well-known statistician
before he became a celebrated qualitative
methodologist may have heightened the
inflexibility of the debate. Consequently, an
unexpected consequence of this paradox is
that interpretivism has been just as positivist
on qualitative generalization as quantitative
methods have.
Second, the concept of theoretical sampling
has failed to address the problem of sam-
ple representativeness which Denzin himself
(1971) considered so important. Likewise,
the concept of transferability provides ‘no
guidance for researchers about which case to
study – in effect, it implies that any case may
be as good as any other in this respect’(Gomm,
Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 101). This
omission has been pedagogically harmful
because it has permitted several generations
of qualitative researchers entirely to neglect –
in the belief that ‘anything goes’ – this aspect
of the investigative process.
Third, an opportunity has been missed to
rediscuss the entire issue, addressing it in more
practical (and not solely theoretical) terms
with a view to developing a new sampling
theory: an idiographic theory, joint and equal
with statistical theory, and which remedies a
series of ancestral misunderstandings:
denial of the capacity of case study research to
support empirical [distributive] generalization often
seems to rest on the mistaken assumption that this
form of generalization requires statistical sampling.
This restricts the idea of representation to its
statistical version; it confuses the task of empirical
generalization with the use of statistical techniques
to achieve that goal. While those techniques are
a very effective basis for generalization, they are
not essential. (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster,
2000: 104)
Sampling in some contemporary
sciences
The first step in this endeavor is to survey
certain disciplines – paleontology, archaeol-
ogy, geology, ethology, biology, astronomy,
anthropology, cognitive science, linguistics
(which for some scientists is more reputable
than sociology) – and see how they have
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tackled the problems of representativeness
and generalizability. In certain respects, these
are disciplines akin to qualitative research,
for they work exclusively on few cases and
have learnt to make a virtue out of necessity.
As Becker writes:
Archeologists and paleontologists have this prob-
lem to solve when they uncover the remnants of
a now-vanished society. They ﬁnd some bones,
but not a whole skeleton; they ﬁnd some cooking
equipment, but not the whole kitchen; they ﬁnd
some garbage, but not the stuff of which the
garbage is the remains. They know that they are
lucky to have found the little they have, because
the world is not organized to make life easy for
archeologists. So they don’t complain about having
lousy data. (1998: 70–1)
For reasons of space, it is not possible here to
provide an exhaustive account of how these
disciplines have dealt with the above issues.
But by way of example, consider the following
study, which is one of the dozens published on
the subject. It appeared in the journal Nature
on January 23, 2003.
The scientist Xing Xu and colleagues
(2003) of the Institute of Vertebrate Palaeon-
tology, Beijing, had found six fossils in
the province of Liaoning, North China.
The impression left in the rock was of two
pairs of wings and a long feathered tail
of what appeared to be a Microraptor gui:
a dinosaur less than one meter in length
which lived in that region of China around
130 million years ago. According to its
discoverers, the fossil was the missing link
between terricolous dinosaurs and modern
birds, the intermediate evolutionary stage for
which scientists had long been searching.
The discovery has fuelled the debate among
paleontologists on the origin of flight. Whilst
the close kinship between birds and dinosaurs
is accepted by almost all scientists, there is
much disagreement on the evolutionary stages
that led to winged flight. The predominant
theory is that wings began to develop, not
to enable flight but to help the ancestors
of birds to run faster. The small dinosaur
discovered in China instead appeared to
support the opposite hypothesis, namely that
the direct ascendants of birds were animals
which climbed trees and used wings to
glide back to earth. This was the theory
propounded, for example, by the American
naturalist, William Beebe, who as early
as 1915 had predicted the existence of
feathered dinosaurs exactly like Microraptor
gui. However, the British journal urged
caution when evaluating the importance of
the discovery: the Microraptor could also be
an evolutionary blind ally which had not left
descendants.
There are therefore numerous disciplines
which work on a limited number of cases,
and do so consciously; in fact, there is
animated discussion within them on sam-
pling and generalizability. Moreover, this
procedure is adopted by other disciplines
as well: for instance, biology, astrophysics,
history, genetics, anthropology, linguistics,
cognitive science, psychology (whose theo-
ries are largely based on experiments, and
therefore on research conducted on non-
probabilistic samples consisting of psychol-
ogy students). Why, we may ask, is this
procedure acceptable for monkeys, rocks,
and cells but not for human beings? Why
do the majority of disciplines work with/on
non-probability samples (regarded as being
just as representative of their relative pop-
ulations and therefore as producing gen-
eralizable results) while in sociology this
is not possible? Why can a geneticist like
Luca Cavalli Sforza of Stanford University
argue that the evolution of language has
had a direct impact on our genetic her-
itage, while in sociology a similar claim
would require very different methodological
support? The majority of these disciplines
start from the assumption that their objects
of study possess quasi-invariant states on
the properties observed: that is, their states
with respect to a property (e.g. size of the
brain or the physique of a hominid) vary
little and slowly among members of the
class. Consequently, these disciplines are
unconcerned about their use of only a handful
of cases to draw inferences and generaliza-
tions about thousands of people, animals,
plants, and other objects. Moreover, science
studies the individual object/phenomenon not
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in itself but as a member of a broader
class of objects/phenomena with particular
characteristics/properties.
FOUR PROPOSALS FOR AN
IDIOGRAPHIC SAMPLING THEORY
The above survey of disciplines midway
between the natural sciences and the social
science yields a number of suggestions
for formulation of an idiographic sampling
theory. They can be summarized in the
following four steps:
(a) abandon the (statistical) principle of probability;
(b) recover the (statistical) principle of variance;
(c) pay renewed attention to the units of analysis;
(d) identify social regularities.
Representativeness without
probability
The use of probability samples does not
automatically signify the use of representative
samples. Random and representative are terms
neither synonymous nor necessarily inter-
related. ‘Randomness’ concerns a particular
procedure used to select the cases to include in
a sample, while ‘representativeness’ concerns
the outcome of the selection. One may
question whether the former is the obligatory
path for the latter. Nor do representativeness
and probability form a natural pair, since it
may be possible to construct a representative
sample using other procedures. Qualitative
research (or at least a part of it) does
not relinquish the aim of working with
representative samples; it only rejects the
obligatory nexus between probabilistic and
representative (on the one hand), or between
randomness and representativeness (on the
other).
It is therefore not necessarily the case
that a researcher must choose between an
(approximately) random sample or an entirely
subjective one – or between a sample which
is (even only) partially probabilistic and one
about whose representativeness absolutely
nothing can be said. Between the rationalism
and the postmodern nihilism underlying these
two positions, one may attempt to address
the problem in practical terms, doing so
by examining the nature of the units of
analysis considered, rather than adhering to
standard procedural rules. As stressed by
Rositi (1993: 198), we may reasonably doubt
the generalizability of findings from
studies of 1,000–2,000 cases which claim to sample
the whole population. We have to wonder if we
should prefer such samples with such aims […].
Studies with samples of 100–200 conversational
interviews, structured to ‘describe’ variables rather
than a population are deﬁnitely more suitable for
a new model of studying society. (1993: 198)
Variance: From (general) principle to
(local) practice
The second step is to recover the (statistical)
principle of variance, which has received
less attention than the probability principle.
Contrary to the latter’s standardizing intent
and automatist inclination (which are among
the reasons for its success), variance is
a criterion which requires the researcher to
reason, to conduct contextual analysis, and
to take local decisions. Under the variance
principle,
in order to determine the sample size, the statistics
must ﬁrst know the range of variance that the
researcher intends tomeasure (at least in sufﬁciently
close terms) because it is likely that, if the range
of variance of variable X is high, n [the number of
individuals to interview] will be high, whereas if the
range of variance is restricted (for example to only
two modalities), n may be very restricted as well.
(Capecchi, 1972: 50)
Hence, it is more likely that a sample will be a
miniature of the population if that population
is tendentially homogeneous; and it is less
likely to be so if the reference population
is tendentially heterogeneous. Consequently,
if the variance is high, the researcher will
require a large number of cases (in order to
include every dimension of the phenomenon
studied in his/her sample). If, instead, the vari-
ance is low, the researcher will presumably
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need only a few cases, and in some instances
only one. In other words,
it is important to recognize that the greater the
heterogeneity of a population themore problematic
are empirical generalizations based on a single case,
or a handful of cases. If we could reasonably assume
that the population were composed of more or less
identical units, then there would be no problem.
(Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 104)
As also Payne and Williams (2005: 306–7)
point out:
the breadth of generalization can be extensive
or narrow, depending on the nature of the
phenomenon under study and our assumptions
about the wider social world (…) [hence] the
generalization may claim high or lower levels of
precision of estimates (…) [and it] will be conditional
upon the ontological status of the phenomena in
question.We can saymore, ormake stronger claims
about some things than others. A taxonomy of
phenomena might look like this: 1◦ physical objects
and their social properties; 2◦ social structures;
3◦ cultural features and artefacts; 4◦ symbols;
5◦ group relationships; 6◦ dyadic relationship;
7◦ psychological dispositions/behaviour (…) This
outline taxonomy demonstrates that generaliza-
tions depend on what levels of social phenomena
are being studied.
The conversation analyst Harvey Sacks
(1992, vol. 1: 485, quoted in Silverman,
2000: 109) reminds us of the anthropologist
and linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf, who
was able to reconstruct Navajo grammar
by extensively interviewing only one native
Indian speaker. Grammars usually have low
variance. However, had Whorf wanted to
study how the Navajo educated their children,
entertained themselves, etc., he would (per-
haps) have found greater variance in the
phenomenon and would have needed more
cases. On this logic, the formal criteria
that guide sampling are more informed by
and embedded in sociological (rather than
statistical) reasoning based on contingent
reflection about the dimensions specific to the
phenomenon investigated and the knowledge
objectives of the research.
Moreover, as said, an authoritative part
of sociological theory and a large part
of anthropological theory are based on
the case study: the quintessence of non-
probability sampling. The research studies by
Alvin G. Gouldner and Melvin Dalton belong
to this category. For example, Gouldner
(1954) studied a gypsum mine situated
close to the university where he taught
(a convenience sample, therefore6). In his
methodological appendix, Gouldner reported
that his team conducted 174 interviews –
and therefore on almost all the population
(precisely 77%). One hundred and thirty-two
of these 174 interviews were conducted with
a ‘representative sample’ of the blue-collar
workers at the company, for which purpose
Gouldner used quota sampling stratified by
age, rank, and tasks. He then constructed
another representative sample of 92 blue-
collar workers, to whom a questionnaire was
administered.
Dalton (1959), who was a company
manager at that time, conducted covert
observation at Milo and Fruhuling, the
fictitious names of two American compa-
nies for which he worked as a consultant
(again a convenience sample, therefore).
The ethnologist De Martino (1961) observed
21 people suffering from tarantism disease;
Goffman (1961) stayed for several months
at a psychiatric hospital; the anthropologist
Geertz (1972) attended 57 cock fights; Sacks
and colleagues described the mechanics
of conversational interaction by analyzing
a few telephone calls; the anthropologist
Crapanzano (1980) studied Moroccan social
relations through the experience of Tuhami,
a tilemaker. The anthropologist Griaule
(1948) reconstructed the cosmology of the
Dogon, a tribe in Mali, by questioning only
a small group of informants; Bourdieu’s
book (1993) on professions was based on
50 interviews with policewomen, temporary
workers, attorneys, blue-collar workers, civil
servants, and unemployed workers.
Why, one may ask, have such circum-
scribed studies given rise to such wide-
ranging theories? In other words, why have
they been generalized to other contexts? I shall
answer these questions later. For the moment
I would stress (and avoid) the danger of
the nihilistic or postmodern drift implied
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by this approach, where any sample may
serve and it is not worth bothering too much
about it. Instead, at a certain point of the
inquiry, giving clear definition to the units
of analysis (an operation performed before
the cases are selected, and therefore before
the sample is constructed) is of extreme
importance if the research is not to be botched
and empirically inconsistent. On analyzing
a series of Finnish studies on ‘artists,’Mitchell
and Karttunen (1991) found that the results
differed according to the definition given to
‘artist’ by the researchers, a definition which
then guided construction of the sample. In
some studies, the category ‘artist’ included
(i) subjects who defined themselves as
artists; (ii) those permanently engaged in
the production of works of art; (iii) those
recognized as artists by society at large; and
(iv) those recognized as such by associations
of artists. The obvious consequence was that it
was subsequently impossible to compare the
results of these studies.
Units of analysis
The standard practice in sociology and
political science is to choose clearly defined
and easily detectable individual or col-
lective units: persons, households, groups,
associations, movements, parties, institutions,
organizations, regions, or states. The consis-
tency of these collective subjects is vague.
In practice, members of these groups are
interviewed individually: the head of the
family, the human resources manager, the
statistics department manager, and so on.
This means that the sampling unit (e.g. the
family) is different from the observational
unit (i.e. the single respondent as a mem-
ber of the family). Only a focus group
can (at least to some extent) preserve the
integrity of the collective subject. Instead,
choosing individuals implies an atomistic
rather than organic conception of society
(Burgess, 1927), whose structural elements
are taken for granted or reckoned to be
mirrored in the individual (Galtung, 1967:
37), while the sociological tradition that
gives priority to relations over individuals is
neglected. As a consequence, the following
more dynamic units are neglected as well:
• beliefs, attitudes, stereotypes, opinions;
• emotions, motivations;
• behaviors, social relations, meetings, interactions,
ceremonies, rituals, networks;
• cultural products (such as pictures, paintings,
movies, theatre plays, television programs);
• rules and social conventions;
• documents and texts (historical, literary, journal-
istic);
• situations and events (wars, elections).
Hence, ‘a reliable sampling model that rec-
ognizes interaction must be adopted [so that
sampling is conducted on] interactive units
(such as social relationships, encounters,
organizations)’ (Denzin, 1971: 269).
The researcher should focus his/her inves-
tigation on these kinds of units, not only
because social processes are more easily
detectable and observable, but also because
these units allow more direct and deeper
analysis of the characteristics observed.
Consider the following illustrative example. Assume that we want to study work practices at call
centers, which are technology-intensive workplaces. In Italy, it has been calculated that there were
1350 call centers in 2002. In order to construct a probability and representative sample, we may
proceed in two ways: randomly extract a certain number of cases from the population list (which is
possible because a complete list can be obtained from the Chambers of Commerce), or construct a
proportional stratiﬁed sample. In this latter case, we must ﬁrst classify call centers according to the
properties that interest us:
• the ownership of the organization, so that we have private call centers (e.g. Vodafone), public ones (e.g.
the 911 emergency helpline), and non-proﬁt ones;
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• the ‘vocation,’ so that we have call centers that are ‘generalist’ (in the sense that they provide a variety
of services) or ‘vertical’ (i.e. dedicated to only one service, e.g. credit recovery);
• membership or otherwise of the organization for which the service is provided, so that we have call
centers ‘internal’ to the company, or ones to which the work is outsourced;
• the classic variables such as size of the organization (small, medium, large), geographical location
(north-west, north-east, centre, south, islands), etc.;
• the type of service furnished.
Note that many of these properties are mutually exclusive, so that the sampling decision must be
carefully pondered. In these cases, the usual practice is for the researcher to base the probability
sampling on the ﬁrst property. However, this may be sociologically inadequate if the researcher’s
interest is in work practices, because these cannot be accessed via the variable ‘ownership.’ For some
authors (e.g. Capecchi, 1972), representativeness does not seem to transfer from one property to
another. Put otherwise: it is not the variance of the ownership of call centers that interests us
here, but the variance of work practices. It might be more satisfactory to choose property (e).
Experience of this sector of inquiry (but also the literature, previous research, interviews with
experts or operators in the sector, etc.) shows that call centers mainly provide the following services:
counseling, credit recovery, marketing, interviewing, and advertising. Constructing a probability
sample on this classiﬁcation is practically impossible because a population list for each of these
activities does not exist. The only alternative is to use the method outlined in the previous section.
Again on the basis of experience, we note that only the ﬁrst of these ﬁve activities has substantial
variance, while the four latter seem to have low variance. In fact, the counseling provided by call
centers is multiform: it consists of information, technical assistance, psychological help or support,
medical advice, or therapy. Consequently, in order to preserve the representativeness of the sample,
we must sample several cases for the speciﬁc work practice of counseling. If we have insufﬁcient
resources to collect the necessary number of cases, we can restrict our research to only some
activities. Other studies in the future will account for the rest.
It is evident that representativeness is
not always possessed by the sample when
research begins. It is a resource also acquired
ex post, progressively and iteratively, research
project after research project, with the gradual
accumulation of expertise. This definition of
representativeness seems somehow to tie this
property to the relation between the results
obtained by an individual research project
and the experience of the researcher who
conducts it.
In search of social regularities
I now turn to the final aspect of the entire
question. There are three broad criteria which
serve to orient the construction of a non-
probability sample; and to each of them
corresponds a particular form of reasoning
alternative to inductive or statistical inference:
deductive inference, comparative inference,
and emblematic case.
The three criteria impose different cogni-
tive objectives, and they are used according to
the type of generalization that the researcher
wants to make. The first two criteria are
in some way opposed to each other: com-
parative inference maximizes the probability
of extracting odd cases; deductive inference
selects only odd (deviant) cases. Theoretical
inference instead concentrates on emblematic
cases, focusing on social similarities.
Deductive inference
The first criterion consists of the choice of
a critical or deviant case which can be used
(à la Popper) to prove the refutability of an
accredited or standard theory. An outstanding
example of its application is provided by
Goldthorpe et al.’s study (1968) of workers
in the town of Luton. The distinctive feature
of this inferential process is that it starts from
a theory of which it intends to prove the
implausibility: in this case the embourgeoise-
ment of the working class. The theory is tested
against a case comprising the largest number
(and the greatest intensity) of its founding
properties or requirements of this theory. If, in
these optimal conditions, the consequences
foreseen by the theory do not ensue, it is
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extremely unlikely that the theory will work
in all those empirical cases where those
requirements are more weakly present. Hence
the theory is falsified, and its inadequacy
can be legitimately generalized. When the
critical case study procedure is used, the cases
are selected according to their explanatory
power, rather than according to the criteria of
probability theory or their typicality (Mitchell,
1983: 207, 209). Moreover, the legitimacy of
the generalization (of the scant explanatory
capacity of the theory just falsified) depends
not only on the cogency of the rhetorical
argument but also on the strength of the
connections established between theory and
observations.
There are many other important studies
(which follow in a very broad sense the
Popperian approach) which have focused on
deviant cases in order to understand standard
behavior: Goffman (1961) on ceremonies and
rituals in a psychiatric clinic; Cicourel and
Boise (1972) on the interpersonal communi-
cations of deaf children; Garfinkel (1967) on
achievement of sex status in an ‘intersexed’
person; Pollner and Winkler (1985) on
interactions in a family with a mentally
retarded child; and many others.
This criterion can also be used to explore
subcultures or emergent or avant-garde phe-
nomena which may become dominant or
significant in the future, although at present
they are still marginal: see Festinger et al.
(1956) on millenial groups after their pre-
dicted date for the end of the world had
passes; Becker (1953) on marijuana smokers;
Hebdige (1979) on style groups like mods,
punks, skinheads; Fielding (1981) on right-
wing political movements.
The deviant case can also be used to prove
the refutability and falsifiability of a well-
known and received theory, as in Rosenhan’s
(1973) study on the medical-organizational
origin of psychiatric illness, or the already-
cited study by Goldthorpe et al. (1968) on
blue-collar workers in the town of Luton. This
criterion (which is widely applied in biology,
astrophysics, history, genetics, anthropology,
linguistics, paleontology, archaeology, ethol-
ogy, geology) does not determine the extent
to which a phenomenon is widespread in
the population. It only directs the scientific
community’s attention to the phenomenon’s
existence and the need to revise the dominant
theory. The generalization to the population
comes about by default: that is by virtue of
the non-occurrence of the event foreseen by
the theory under examination.
Obviously, the generalization must be
carefully thought through. Otherwise, the
danger arises of lapsing into the determinism
to which Popper’s falsificationism is suscep-
tible. As Lieberson (1992: 212) emphasizes:
it is very difﬁcult to reject a major theory because it
appears not to operate in some speciﬁc setting. One
is wary of concluding that Max Weber was wrong
because of a single deviation in some inadequately
understood time or place. In the same fashion, we
would view an accident caused by a sober driver as
failing to disprove the notion that drinking causes
automobile accidents.
Comparative inference
The second criterion is used to make gen-
eralizations similar to statistical inferences,
but without employing probability criteria.
This can be done by identifying cases
within extreme situations as well as certain
characteristics, or cases within a wide range of
situations in order to maximize variation, that
is, to have all the possible situations in order
to capture the heterogeneity of a population.
We can choose two elementary schools
where, from press reports, previous studies,
interviews or personal experiences, we know
we can find two extreme situations: in the
first school there are severe difficulties of
integration between natives and immigrants,
while in the second there are virtually none.
We can also pick three schools: the first with
severe integration difficulties; the second with
average difficulties; and the third with rare
ones. In the 1930s and 1940s, the American
sociologist W. Lloyd Warner (1898–1970) and
his team of colleagues and students carried out
studies on various communities in the United
States. When Warner set about choosing the
samples, he decided to select communities
whose social structures mirrored important
features of American society. He chose four
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communities (given assumed names): a city
in Massachusetts (Yankee City) ruled by tradi-
tions on which he wrote five volumes; a lonely
county of Mississippi (Deep South, 1941); a
Chicago black district (Bronzetown, 1945);
and a city in the Midwest (Jonesville, 1949).
In comparative inferences, the cases are
selected by making careful comparisons: first
by seeking to find cases which represent all the
forms of heterogeneity in a target population,
and then by controlling whether they are
sufficiently homogeneous with the type that
one wants to represent. In this difficult but
important analysis,
it is necessary to compare the characteristics of
the case(s) being studied with available information
about the population to which generalization
is intended (…) we are suggesting that where
information about the larger population (or about
overlapping populations) is available, it should be
used. If it is not available, then the potential
risks involved in generalization still need to be
noted, preferably via speciﬁcation of likely types
of heterogeneity that could render the ﬁndings
unrepresentative. (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster,
2000: 105–106)
We are therefore very distant from the
concepts of naturalistic generalization and
transferability, which are unsatisfactory in
various respects, for they ‘do not provide
a sound basis for the design, or justification,
of case study research’ (Gomm, Hammersley
and Foster, 2000: 102). They assign the reader
a function which should also be performed
by the researcher (assuming responsibility
for affirming the generalizability of the
study’s findings). They therefore relieve the
researcher of responsibility for the careful
selection of cases on the basis of the variance
principle, and not solely on the basis of
the theoretical significance of theoretical
sampling and of all research on variables
(rather than cases). As Schofield (1990) notes,
all too often cases seem to be chosen for
reasons of convenience and are therefore
atypical in various respects.
The emblematic case
If we bear the variance principle in mind,
there emerges a third major criterion for
the construction of a sample: the typical or
emblematic case.
Gouldner’s case studies (1954) on bureau-
cratization in medium-sized firms, or that by
Cicourel (1968) on the relational construction
of the figure of the juvenile delinquent, have
been considered amply generalizable (by both
researchers and readers), probably because
they were typical cases and consequently
grasped structural aspects of the social action
in the organizations studied. Nor should we
forget that the question of generalizability
is closely tied to the phenomenon being
researched, according to the degree of vari-
ance in its states.
This means that it is possible to find cases
which on their own can represent a significant
feature of a phenomenon. Generalizability
thus conceived concerns more general struc-
tures and is detached from individual social
practices, of which they are only an instance.
In other words, the scholar does not generalize
the individual case or event, which as Weber
stressed is unrepeatable, but the key structural
features of which it is made up, and which are
to be found in other cases or events belonging
to the same species or class. As Becker has
recently pointed out:
in every city there is a body of social practices —
forms of marriage, or work, or habitation — which
don’t change much, even though the people who
perform them are continually replaced through
the ordinary demographic process of birth, death,
immigration, and emigration. (2000: 6)
On this view, the question of generalizability
assumes a different significance: for example
in the conclusions to his study on the
relationship between a psychotherapist and
a patient suffering from AIDS, Peräkylä
writes:
The results were not generalizable as descriptions
of what other counselors or other professionals
do with their clients; but they were generalizable
as descriptions of what any counselor or other
professional, with his or her clients, can do, given
that he or she has the same array of interactional
competencies as the participants of the AIDS
counseling session have. (1997: 216, quoted in
Silverman, 2000: 109)
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Something similar happens in film and
radio productions with noise sampling.
The squeak of the door (which gives us the
shivers when we watch a thriller or a horror
film) does not represent all squeaks of doors,
but we associate it with them. We do not think
about the differences between that squeak and
the one made by our front door; we notice the
similarities only. These are two different ways
of thinking, and most social sciences seek to
find patterns of this kind.
While the verbal expressions of an inter-
active exchange may vary, exchange based
on the question-answer pattern features a for-
mal trans-institutional (though not universal)
structure. While laying a page of a newspaper
on the floor and declaring one’s sovereignty
over it (Goffman, 1961) is a behavior observed
in one psychiatric clinic only, the need to have
a private space and control over a territory has
been reported many times, albeit in different
forms.
INTERACTIVE, PROGRESSIVE, AND
ITERATIVE SAMPLING: SOME TIPS
Having outlined the theoretical premises of
an idiographic sampling theory, I shall now
describe its procedural aspects. However,
there is no precise logical itinerary to set out,
because methodological principles and rules
do not have to stand on their own – as they are
instead required to do in statistical sampling
theory – in that they have only a weak
relation to practice. It is instead necessary
to approach the entire question of sampling
sequentially, and it would be misleading to
plan the whole strategy beforehand. In order to
achieve representativeness, the sampling plan
must be set in dialogue with field incidents,
contingencies, and discoveries. This is what
I mean by ‘interactive, progressive, and
iterative sampling.’ An excellent instance of
this procedure ‘is given in Glaser and Strauss’s
(1964, 1968) studies on dying in the hospital,
where hypotheses were developed hand in
hand with data collection’ (Denzin, 1971:
269). Another example of changing or adding
to the sampling plan on the basis of something
the researcher has learnt in the field is provided
by Becker:
Blanche Geer and I were studying college students.
At a certain point, we became interested in
student ‘leaders,’ students who were heads of
major organizations at the university (there were
several hundred of them). We wanted to know
how they became leaders and how they exercised
their powers. So we made a list of the major
organizations (which we could do because we
had been there for a year and knew what those
were, which we would not have known when we
began) and interviewed twenty each of men and
women student leaders. And got a great result —
it turned out that the men got their positions
through enterprise and hustling, while the women
were typically appointed by someone from the
university! (Howard Becker, 13/7/2002, personal
communication)
Consistency must be given to the sampling
reasoning, but not by mere application of
procedural steps. The reasoning could be as
follows.
1 The researcher usually starts from his/her research
questions. Melvin Dalton’s were:
Why did grievers andmanagers form cross-cliques?
Why were staff personnel ambivalent toward line
ofﬁcers?Whywas there disruptive conﬂict between
Maintenance and Operation? If people where
awarded posts because of speciﬁc ﬁtness, why
the disparity between their given and exercised
inﬂuence? Why among executives on the same
formal level, were some distressed and some not?
And why were there such sharp differences in
viewpoint and moral concern about given events?
Whatwas themeaning of double talk about success
as dependent on knowing people rather than on
possessing administrative skills? Why and how
were ‘control’ staffs and ofﬁcial guardians variously
compromised? What was behind the contradictory
policy and practices associated with the use of
company materials and services? Thus the guiding
question embracing all others was: what orders
the schism and ties between ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial
action? (1959: 274)
Research questions comprise the concepts and
categories (behaviors, attitudes, and so on) that
the researcher intends to study.
2 The researcher conducts primary (or ‘provisional’
and ‘open’7: Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 193)
sampling in order to collect cases in accordance
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with the concepts. As Payne and Williams
(2005: 295) suggest, ‘research design should plan
for anticipated generalizations, and that general-
ization should bemore explicitly formulated within
a context of supporting evidence.’
3 Because not every concept can be directly studied,
when the researcher constructs the provisional
sample, s/he considers the following aspects:
a speciﬁcity (focusing on speciﬁc social activi-
ties with distinctive features, like rituals or
ceremonies);
b the ﬁeld’s degree of openness (open or closed
places);
c intrusiveness (the endeavor to reduce the
researcher’s visibility);
d institutional accessibility (free-entry versus
limited-entry situations within the organiza-
tion);
e signiﬁcance (frequent and high organizational
signiﬁcance of social activities).
4 It is advisable to sample type of actions or
events: ‘not, then, men and their moments. Rather
moments and their men’ (Goffman, 1967: 3), ‘not
only people but moments of lived life’ (Converse
and Schuman, 1974: 1), ‘incidents and not
persons per se!’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 177),
in contrast with the common practice of sampling
bodies, and of seeking information from these
bodies about behaviors and events that are never
observed directly (Cicourel, 1996). There are two
reasons for this important recommendation: ﬁrst,
it serves to prevent the survey sampling mistake
concerning the transferability of ideas about
representativeness; second, the same person may
be engaged in overlapping activities. For example,
Dalton (1959), when studying power struggles in
companies, found ﬁve ‘types of cliques:’ vertical
(symbiotic and parasitic), horizontal (defensive and
aggressive), and random. If we sample individuals,
we ﬁnd that they belong to more than one
clique according to the situation, intention, and so
on. If we consider activities, everything becomes
simpler.
5 To date, four main types of sampling have been
developed in social research: purposive, quota,
emblematic, and snowball. When cases are
selected, attention should be paid to the variance
of concept, so that different voices or cases can
be included in the sample.
6 As the research proceeds, the researcher will reﬁne
his/her ideas, categories and concepts, or come
up with new ones. The important thing is to
make connections among them, thus formulating
working hypotheses. Even though not every
hypothesis is testable (indeed the most interesting
ones often are not), if the reader is to be persuaded,
they must be formulated in a testable way.
7 When the researcher has formulated hypotheses,
s/he restarts sampling in order to collect cases
systematically relating to each hypothesis, and
seeking to make his/her analysis consistent.
Strauss and Corbin call this second sampling
‘relational and variational: is associated with
axial coding. It aims to maximize the ﬁnding of
differences at the dimensional level’ (1990: 176).
They depict the research process as funnel-shaped:
through three increasingly focused steps (open,
axial, and selective) the researcher clariﬁes his/her
statements because ‘consistency here means
gathering data systematically on each category’
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 178). When the
researcher ﬁnds an interesting aspect, she/he must
always check whether it occurs in other samples.
8 Generalization must be ensured ‘across and within
cases (…) [because] the danger of error in drawing
general conclusions from a small number of cases
must not be underestimated’ (Gomm, Hammersley
and Foster, 2000: 98). This concept has been
sometimes rubricated as ‘internal generalization,’
and it implies different strategies which take
account of diverse dimensions: time, sites, days,
and people. The researcher should collect cases
of behavior recurring at different moments of
time. Because the researcher cannot observe the
case-study population twenty-four hours a day,
s/he must take a decision on when and where
s/he will observe the population (Schatzman and
Strauss, 1973: 39–41; Corsaro, 1985: 28–32).
Unfortunately,
case study researchers rarely make clear what
they take to be the temporal boundaries of
the cases they have studied (…) it is not
unusual for case studies of schools to focus on
one year-group or cohort of students and to
assume that the experience of these students is
representative of other cohorts, past and future.
(Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 109)
Social practices always occur in certain places and
at certain times of the day. Only if the researcher
knows all the rituals of the organization observed
can s/he draw a representative sample.
A classic illustration is provided by Berlak et al.’s
study of progressive primary school practice in
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Britain in the 1970s (Berlak and Berlak, 1981;
Berlak et al., 1975). They argued that previous
American accounts had been inaccurate because
observation had been brief and had tended to take
place in the middle of the week, not on Monday
or Friday. On the basis of these observations,
the inference had been drawn that in progressive
classrooms children simply chosewhat theywanted
to do and got on with it. As Berlak et al. document,
however, what typically happened was that the
teachers set out the week’s work on Mondays,
and on Fridays they checked that it had been
completed satisfactorily. Thus, earlier studies were
based on false temporal generalizations within
cases they investigated. (Gomm, Hammersley and
Foster, 2000: 109–110)
Qualitative researchers do not seek to know the
distribution of such behaviors (how many times);
they only seek to know whether they are recurrent
and signiﬁcant in the organization under study. In
addition, ‘our concern is with representativeness
of concepts’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 190). And
ﬁnally, in regard to people and sites,
there is also likely to be variation in the behavior
of both teachers and pupils across different
contexts within a school. While most contact
between members of the two groups probably
occur in classrooms, they also meet one another
in other places as well: in assembly halls, dining
rooms, corridors, on game ﬁelds, and so on
(…) Teacher-pupil relationships are likely to vary
across mathematics classrooms, drama studios
and science laboratories, for example. (Gomm,
Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 111)
9 The researcher can sample new incidents or
s/he can review incidents already collected:
‘Theoretical sampling is cumulative. This is
because concepts and their relationships also
accumulate through the interplay of data
collection and analysis […] until theoretical
saturation of each category is reached’ (Strauss
and Corbin, 1990: 178, 188).
10 This interplay between sampling and hypothesis
testing is needed because
a representative samples are not predicted
in advance but found, constructed, and
discovered gradually in the ﬁeld;
b it reﬂects the researcher’s experience, previous
studies, and the literature on the topic. In other
words, the researcher will come to know the
variance of a phenomenon cumulatively, study
by study. As Gomm, Hammersley and Foster
(2000: 107) acknowledge:
it is possible for subsequent investigations
to build on earlier ones by providing
additional cases, so as to construct a
sample over time thatwould allow effective
generalization. At the present, this kind of
cumulation is unusual (…) the cases are
not usually selected in such a way as to
complement previous work;
c representative samples are used to justify the
researcher’s statements.
It is therefore apparent that, although on the
one hand ‘generalization is not an issue that
can be dismissed as irrelevant by case study
researchers’(Gomm, Hammersley and Foster,
2000: 111), on the other it is not the impossible
undertaking that survey researchers have
always mocked. Finally, whilst probability
sampling has a substantive aim – to construct
a sample in order to extend the findings to the
population – interactive sampling has a further
task: to reflect, through its recursiveness, on
the plausibility of generalizations.
CONCLUSION
Statistical inference (survey) and theoretical
inference (experiment), as the two legitimate
ways to draw general conclusions, continue
to be used even though their application is
fraught with difficulties; and they in fact
end up by deviating from their theoretical
principles and assumptions. Hence one fails to
understand why it is not possible to resort to
other forms of generalization which, though
unsatisfactory, are no more unsatisfactory
that those deemed superior to them. For that
matter, contemporary social scientists do not
have to choose between perfect and imperfect
forms of generalization, but between forms
of inference whose strengths and weaknesses
depend on the researcher’s cognitive aims,
the research situation, and the nature of the
phenomenon under study.
The central idea of this essay lies
midway between two highly authoritative
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and well-known methodological proposals:
Durkheim’s (1912) cas pur (the ‘pure case’),
with positivist overtones, and Max Weber’s
(1904) theory of ideal types. Durkheim
believed that the simplest society of all for
study of the elementary forms of religious
life was the Australian tribe of the Arunta.
The Flemish statistician and sociologist
Adolphe Quételet (1796–1874) looked to the
crowd for his homme moyen (the average
man), who represented the ‘normality’ of the
species. He was prompted to do so by the
discovery that certain characteristics (physical
and biological) of individuals were distributed
in the populations which he studied according
to the ‘normal’ curve constructed by the
mathematician Gauss.
Conversely, Weber maintained that ‘feu-
dal society,’ ‘bureaucracy,’ ‘charisma’ were
genetic concepts (developed with a view to
a causal explanation) and limiting concepts.
They consequently could not be evaluated
in terms of their reality-describing adequacy,
only in terms of their instrumental efficacy.
For Weber (1904), an ideal type was not
a representation of the real; rather, it was
formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or
more points of view and by the connection of
a quantity of diffuse, discrete, more or less
present and occasionally absent, particular
phenomena. Given the conceptual purity of
an ideal type, it could never be empirically
detected in reality; it was a utopian entity.
The typical or emblematic case suggested
as a criterion for the construction of sample
stands midway between the claim to have
discovered the pure case (the quintessence
of the phenomenon studied) and renunciation
of the empirical search for cases of interest
because of their typicality.
At the end of the 1980s, in a study on
the interview, I documented the rituals and
rhetorical strategies used by an interviewer
as he made telephone calls to 10 adolescents
in order to arrange subsequent face-to-face
interviews (Gobo, 1990, 2001). The research
involved the recording of the telephone calls
and subsequent discourse analysis. Some
years later, Maynard and Schaeffer (1999)
conducted very similar research in the United
States. Comparison between the results of the
two research studies showed that the three
researchers had discovered almost identical
patterns of behavior. The reason for this simi-
larity was probably that the survey interview-
ers had been trained with textbooks widely
used on both sides of theAtlantic, and that they
had used artifacts – technological (telephone,
keyboard), cognitive (questionnaires), and
organizational (scripts or interview formats) –
which made the social activities very similar.
There are consequently numerous social
research settings in which a few cases may
suffice to make a generalization. Provided
they are chosen carefully.
NOTES
1 To be stressed is that the distinction between
probability and non-probability does not mark
the boundary between qualitative and quantitative
research: in fact, non-probability samples are also used
for surveys (quota, telephone, and so on) and for
experiments.
2 This compromise centered on the idea of
complementarity is still accepted by numerous
methodologists: see for instance Payne and Williams
(2005: 297).
3 Indeed, there are some who maintain that
generalizability is perhaps the wrong word for what
qualitative researchers seek to achieve: ‘Generaliza-
tion is (…) [a] word (…) that should be reserved for
surveys only’ (Alasuutari, 1995: 156–7).
4 However, Denzin’s (1971) position was very
different at the end of the 1960s: he expressed himself
in favor of operationalization (‘this does notmean that
operationalization is avoided – it merely suggests that
the point of operazionalization is delayed until the
situated meaning of concepts is discovered,’ p. 268);
he believed that the use of indicators was important
(‘a series of empirical indicators relevant to each data
base and hypothesis must be constructed, and, last,
researchmust progress in a formativemanner inwhich
hypotheses and data continually interrelate,’ p. 269),
and he argued that ‘it is necessary for researchers to
demonstrate the representativeness of those units in
the total population of similar events’ (p. 269).
5 Gommet al. (2000: 112, endnote 2) acutely point
out: ‘there is some ambiguity in Stake’s position. He
also recognizes that case studies can be instrumental
rather than intrinsic, and in an outline of the ‘major
conceptual responsibilities’ of case study inquiry
he lists the ﬁnal one as ‘developing assertions or
generalizations about the case (Stake, 1994, 244).’
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6 For this reason, apparently too severe and
without empirical justiﬁcation is Payne and Williams’
statement that: ‘opportunistic site selection will
normally be incompatible with even moderatum
generalization’ (2005: 310).
7 As Strauss and Corbin (1990: 176) explain:
‘open sampling is associated with open coding.
Openness rather than speciﬁcity guides the sampling
choices.’ Open sampling can be performed purpo-
sively (e.g. pp. 183–4) or systematically (e.g. p. 184),
or it occurs fortuitously (e.g. pp. 182–3). It includes
on-site sampling.
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